Is it Too Late to Learn Lessons for the Future of Iraq?

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In recent decades, political development theory and democratization studies largely ignored post-World War II Germany and Japan, or treated them as exceptions. The prospect of a military occupation of Iraq renewed interest in these and other nation-building cases, in search of guidance on American and coalition policies post-Saddam. A wide range of efforts has been offered on ‘winning the peace’ in Iraq. But even as the ‘who lost Iraq?’ genre began, essential tasks in Iraq and the search for guidance on achieving them remained. Comparative studies on post-conflict nation-building in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and elsewhere have yielded important insights on the large and small technical tasks in the areas of security, democracy, administrative capacity, and economic reconstruction. But adding to Germany and Japan consideration of a seemingly irrelevant national experience – post-Cold War Russia – reveals a variety of factors and dynamics that may influence the direction of Iraq.

Nation-building, according to James Dobbins, is ‘the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy’ and is ‘the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower’.1 Francis Fukuyama ascribed to nation-building four separate functions: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconstruction, and development.2 The idea of foreign forces bringing democracy to a nation is controversial but it is not new. Positive and negative lessons can be drawn from experience with direct coercive democratization (such as post-war Germany and Japan, and others) and externally guided or aided democratization (such as early 1990s post-Communism). Some analysts think that the idea of building a democracy in Iraq and transforming the Middle East is absurd and doomed to failure. Others, despite reservations they may have had, offered prescriptions for what Iraq, the United States, and the international community must do to have any chance for success in Iraq. It is unquestionable that Iraq and the international order today are remarkably different from earlier cases. But it also may be true that the efforts and outcomes of previous cases can offer insight on current security, economic and political concerns.

This article is composed of three parts. The first examines significant research efforts which sought to understand the lessons of nation-building from historic cases and which asked whether those lessons apply to Iraq. The second part considers the lessons of post-war Germany and Japan and the experience of post-Cold War Russia. Finally, the essay seeks to identify the factors that will determine whether Iraq becomes a rare success story, or joins the ranks of at-risk or failing states.

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Two sets of results emerge. The first is a number of military, political and economic factors – technical or administrative tasks – that might serve as a checklist for ensuring that a rebuilding country is doing those things necessary to give it the best chance for peaceful, prosperous, and relatively democratic success. The second set of results reveals a series of dynamics conducive to the transformation of a state. These dynamics identify attitudes, assumptions, context, and commitment – the ‘atmosphere’ in which the technical and administrative tasks are undertaken. For Iraq, the most relevant factor was a secure, stable environment, the lack of which hindered other tasks. The dynamics of particular interest included a real and lasting commitment by the United States and the coalition, the emergence of widely supported and particularly talented Iraqi leadership, and increased evidence of ‘learning’ among Iraqi elites and masses and among the coalition and international community.

Lessons from the Historical Cases

Before 2001, democratization theory was focused primarily on the ‘third wave’ of democracies, those formed since 1974. There is some loose geographical and chronological correlation among the cases: first southern Europe, then Latin America, and finally post-Communist Europe and elsewhere.

In the lead up to war in Iraq, a wide range of recommendations were promulgated for coalition policy ‘after Saddam’. Some sought insights from the proliferation of nation-building efforts of the 1990s, but attention also returned to post-war Germany and Japan. While officials of the President George W. Bush administration acknowledged that these were being considered as possible models for post-Saddam Iraq, critics said numerous differences made that approach inappropriate. Japan and Germany were ethnically homogeneous, with a middle class and at least some prior experience with democracy. The post-war international situation and the Truman administration’s political values were different than today. Moreover, there was concern that the American public and the US government underestimated the extent of the military, political and financial commitments that would be required in Iraq, particularly with limited support from allies. Finally, there were cautions that ‘after Saddam’ might look more like 1990s Yugoslavia (or at least, divided Germany) than post-war Japan.

Nevertheless, in the search for policy guidance, scholars found lessons in those two large cases and in Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere. This section reviews research findings that sought lessons for Iraq based on the experience of previous nation-building efforts (see Figure 1). These studies typically considered post-World War II Germany and Japan as well as more recent efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Afghanistan. Lessons from the historical cases of nation-building research tend to break down into two major categories: factors and dynamics.

Factors
Factors are generally technical, short-term tasks such as police training, currency reform, or parliamentary elections. In general, they fall within military, political, and economic sub-groupings.
Military factors include efforts such as separating and disarming combatting parties, establishing a secure operating environment, purging military leaders, subordinating (de iure and de facto) the military to the civilian government, and integrating the military into international institutions and agreements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
<th>Operational Guidance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bellin (2004–2005)</td>
<td>Germany, Japan, Haiti, Bosnia</td>
<td>Iraq is more similar to Haiti and Bosnia than to Germany and Japan, but the latter still offer valid lessons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crane &amp; Terrill (2003)</td>
<td>Pre-World War II cases, Germany, Japan, Panama, Haiti, Balkans</td>
<td>Need substantial time, manpower, and money. Will be difficult to achieve political stability in Iraq.</td>
<td>Historical problems with planning, commitment, force size, civilian handover.</td>
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<td>Dobbins et al. (2003)</td>
<td>Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Most important are commitment to extensive time (at least 5 years), manpower and money.</td>
<td>Iraq difficult, but possible. Importance of security, multilateralism, sufficient force size, and ensuring stability.</td>
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<td>Dobbins et al. (2005)</td>
<td>1960s Belgian Congo and several UN-led efforts post-1989</td>
<td>UN does smaller, less ambitious efforts than US, but more effective.</td>
<td>Underfunded and undermanned, US efforts have greater international legitimacy and &quot;soft power&quot;.</td>
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<td>Jennings (2003)</td>
<td>Germany, Japan, Afghanistan</td>
<td>US lacks post-conflict commitment, not know-how. Each of political will undermines its military doctrine.</td>
<td>Substantial commitment to ensure rule of law, engage the population, promote security.</td>
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<td>Khalilzad (2005)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>US leadership, committed to its ideals and &quot;enlightened, hands-on&quot; policy.</td>
<td>US as ally, not occupier. Indigenous, democratic, cooperative elites are key.</td>
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<td>Paris (2004)</td>
<td>Eleven cases from post-1989 Africa, Balkans and Central America</td>
<td>Where institutions are lacking, building liberal states, instead of just security, are undermined both.</td>
<td>Prioritize order over democracy; introduce political and economic reform gradually.</td>
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<td>Orr (2004)</td>
<td>Jagan, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq</td>
<td>Advanced planning is crucial; planning and occupation to be done with local institutions.</td>
<td>Iraq needs security, political participation, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation.</td>
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Source: See endnote 6 for full citations.
Perhaps most of all, lessons from the historical cases emphasized the necessary scale and commitments of manpower, money, and time. While estimates of what constituted ‘necessary’ varied, each study suggested that success in Iraq would require an expensive, long-term undertaking. The occupying forces (or peacekeepers, in better scenarios) must have the capacity to secure the peace from any domestic or foreign belligerents, secure the borders and provide basic public safety. Careful attention must be paid to the balance of power, and the transfer of power, between military and civilian authorities, and between the host country and the international forces. Additionally, the competing ethnic and sectarian groups must be satisfied. For Iraq, that included Shiites confident that Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party would not return to repress them, minority Sunnis that they would not be repressed by the rise of Shiites to power, and Kurds that much of their autonomy (and oil assets) would be preserved.

The studies also asserted that in coordination with political and economic reforms new security institutions must be constructed and new military-civilian relations established. Transferring authority to Iraqis would require reform not only of its military but police, border control and other units. The role of the Iraqi military as a potentially stabilizing and unifying force for the country would need to be balanced with military purges and war crimes trials.

The local and global military environment was also considered. The studies warned of the impact of Iraq’s neighbours on its security, and the impact of American, European and others’ evolving judgements of their own political and security interests. Finally, the studies concurred that military factors provide the foundation for nation-building: security is the prerequisite for accomplishing the humanitarian, political and economic tasks of nation-building.

Political factors, or tasks, include the basics of constructing new institutions as well as resolving outstanding problems with previous state structures. Key efforts include a new constitution, new political institutions, justice and reconciliation, and democracy education. The studies directed attention to Iraq’s ethnic, religious and tribal divisions; many of the political tasks revolve around these divisions. Previous conflicts and injustices must be addressed, through a combination of measured de-Ba’athification and ‘truth and reconciliation’ efforts like some in Africa.

The studies suggested that beyond post-war, occupation and transition challenges, Iraq could expect the ‘usual’ difficulties of governing a divided society and the problems of federalism as a solution. Artificial deadlines and poorly-timed elections, for example, might be counterproductive, by elevating group-based partisans over those with a sense of national identity. Building effective state capacity – a working bureaucracy – needs to be combined with endowing those institutions with popular legitimacy and widespread participation, not merely shifting power and access from one group to another.

Any anticipated benefit of having some prior experience with constitutionalism was, in some studies, presumed to be more than offset by Iraq’s political culture, namely, a political culture perhaps ‘not ready’ for democracy. Other studies noted, in contrast, that accountability for past injustices, training and education in democratic values and practices, and effective work with local institutions can make considerable contributions to nation-building.
Economic factors in nation-building involve immediate humanitarian relief, restructuring of the economy, and economic recovery that is tangible to the population and contributes to state stability. Factors such as macroeconomic stabilization, economic democratization (such as land and labour reform), and integration with the global trade and finance regimes are needed to contribute to stability and improvement at the state and household levels.

Among the studies seeking lessons for Iraq, particular attention was given to Iraq’s oil resources as a source of funds for recovery and reconstruction, but also of political and regional infighting. Another key was the debate over the extent to which the United States or Germany and Japan themselves were responsible for those ‘economic miracles’. Access to foreign capital and foreign aid, Iraq’s ability to absorb such funds, and issues in education and health were also noted.9

A final factor applies across the security, political and economic arenas, under the general notion of ‘planning’. Nearly every study of historical cases of nation-building identified the important role of planning, or the evident lack of it. Planning ought to occur well in advance, with appropriate goals and sufficient funding. It ought to be well-articulated, based on the interests of the host country and in coordination with local capacities. Coordination is required among the relevant international states and organizations, and also between the various agencies within each country. Planning might be approached chronologically or thematically, but it must be done seriously. One study contributed to the development of a new nation-building office at the US State Department, with a focus on planning and on improving implementation.10 Other studies, though, noted the US State Department’s Future of Iraq Project, and the Defense Department’s conspicuous dismissal of it.

Dynamics

Beyond particular military, political and economic factors, analyses of the historical cases reveal certain dynamics that correlate with successful nation-building. Dynamics reflect the ‘atmosphere’ or ‘environment’ of the nation-building effort. Rather than technical achievements, they induce or indicate progress but do not permit easy measurement. The various studies seeking lessons for Iraq offered at least five dynamics: mutual commitment of elites, institutional quality, evident popular benefits, a conducive international environment, and ‘learning’.

First, the studies emphasized the importance of extraordinarily capable, committed and mutual leadership, among the host country and the international parties. Key concerns are the coordination of interests among the host-country elites, and between them and the occupying elites. The latter ought to be supportive of local elites, building cooperation and agreement on the country’s strategy and vision. The foreign elites must share a genuine and well-articulated commitment to the nation-building effort, demonstrated by overt political and financial support – studies noted that lack of will, not lack of know-how, was a more likely source of failure. Elites in the host country are also better co-opted than coerced. Beyond the oft-cited support by Japan’s post-war Emperor Hirohito for General Douglas MacArthur, one study highlighted the success of bringing the insurgent groups into the political process in Mozambique.11
A second important dynamic is institutional quality. This does not mean the correctness of any particular technical aim. Rather, it means that the rule of law, democratic and market institutions, economic recovery and domestic security are animated with the development of democratic values. Most of the nation-building studies focused on the technical aspects and short- and medium-term goals of a new constitution and new security, political, and economic institutions. But these institutions need to be committed in writing to democratic values from the beginning, even if high expectations cannot be met soon. It is the long-term development of democratic values in the elites, the masses and their institutions, rather than any particular technical detail, that binds the population and the government together and that will determine long-run transformation.

The studies noted the importance of a third dynamic, evident benefits for the populations of both the host and foreign countries. The local society must perceive benefits or future benefits from the arrangement, whether political, economic or security. Economic benefits may not appear rapidly, and some studies asked how much this delay mattered. The international parties also need popular support at home, sufficient for initiating and sustaining efforts which may not yield large and obvious short-term progress but which can produce substantial financial costs and military burdens, including possible casualties.

The international environment also proved to be an important dynamic in the historical cases of nation-building. First is a question of legitimacy, concerning whether the effort has some imprimatur by the global and regional community. United Nations’ approval might be the gold standard. It is not strictly required for legitimacy, but lacking it can make the case more difficult. Regional context – ‘the neighbourhood’ – also affects efforts. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s location made it a possible candidate for the European Union, for example, while Afghanistan’s subjected it to the influence of Iran, Pakistan, and former Soviet states in Central Asia. Finally, larger geostrategic questions can be important. Germany was considered an essential asset by both sides as the Cold War dawned, but post-Cold War conditions allowed for some cooperation in the Balkans between Russia and its former adversaries.

Finally, the analyses of nation-building address the importance of planning and policy review, but generally pay less attention to the longer-term dynamic of ‘learning’. This is the process – among elites and masses, the public and private sector, and between generations – that creates and reflects real changes. The ability of the host country and the foreign powers to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts, to recognize changing conditions, and to adjust their strategies or even their goals accordingly, are all elements of learning and critical to nation-building.

Lessons from Germany, Japan – and Russia

Analysis of the historical cases and of current Iraq policy can be seen in a different light if another case is considered: post-Cold War Russia. Critics of this approach might cite the very different nature, duration and conclusion of the ‘conflict’ compared to Germany, Japan, Bosnia, or Afghanistan. Most obviously, the United
States did not lead a military occupation of Russia. But the case of Russia should not be dismissed too easily.

First, the broad goals of the three cases were similar: transformation of a former adversary and integration of it into a peaceful community of states. These are not merely the aims of nation-building; rather, they extend to the ideas of Karl Deutsch and others on political security communities and creating lasting, peaceful relationships.\textsuperscript{13}

Second, the tasks to achieve these goals were similar: reducing the military threat (demilitarization, or the more modest cooperative threat reduction), establishing a democratic system in a political culture of questionable fit, and restructuring and restoring the economy.

Third, each case had similar motivations. Both realism and idealism drove American occupation policy toward Germany and Japan and American advice and assistance to Russia in the 1990s. Arguably, it was both realism and idealism that motivated intervention in Iraq, as well.\textsuperscript{14}

Fourth, the geopolitical environments in each case made the international system vulnerable to real change. The post-war and post-Cold War eras were moments of dramatic (but not universal) democratic expansion. As part of the hyperpower’s post-9/11 global war on terror, influential neoconservatives in the Bush administration shaped a policy for democratization in the Middle East, beginning with regime change in Iraq.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite early difficulties and early critics, progress in Germany and Japan was substantial to the point where there was ‘no temptation to flirt with totalitarianism’ or take other nondemocratic avenues.\textsuperscript{16} The recognition over time that Germany and Japan were developing into free market, democratic bulwarks against Communism created a high estimation of the impact of American efforts.\textsuperscript{17} The post-war experience offered as its lessons the idealism that the United States could fundamentally reshape post-Cold War Russian institutions and values, and the realism that it was in the United States’ own interest to do so. The same rhetoric was later adopted for Iraq.

Beyond providing a recent, large, industrial, bureaucratic example, the case of Russia augments the accumulation of analytic tools and policy lessons in nation-building in one additional way. While Germany and Japan might be too easily remembered today as relatively simple and overwhelmingly successful, Russia provides not only a recent ‘to do’ list, but also evidence of difficulties, ‘satisficing’,\textsuperscript{18} and even failure.

\textit{Factors in Russia}

After World War II, Germany and Japan experienced occupation, complete demilitarization, thorough purges of their military elites, war crimes trials and sharp constitutional restrictions on their armed forces; Russia did not. The United States never sought to occupy Russia or to eliminate its military. Reductions on both sides were made through negotiation, domestic leadership choices and budget pressures. Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) efforts were made to secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) concerns, but with difficulties.\textsuperscript{19} Russia’s military became enmeshed in a brutal struggle against ethnic separatists, and was even called upon to break a legislative deadlock. And unlike Germany and Japan, Russia was only
partially integrated into the post-war security architecture of the West. A new relationship between Russia and NATO evolved, but not to full membership. There developed no new, visionary security construct, and Russia (unlike its Warsaw Pact allies) could not be squeezed into the old one.

The political factors in post-war democratization included dealing with the old elites, political purges, new democratic constitutions, and efforts to convince the populations that democratization was good. After Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 1993 military assault on the parliament, there was significant progress in the political transformation of Russia. As in Germany and Japan, Russia got a new constitution, establishing new institutions and placing sovereignty in the people. The constitution was not written by Americans (although many worked on earlier drafts), but by appointees of a popularly-elected president, and it was approved in a national referendum. The constitution gave the president strong powers, but unlike under Gorbachev, the Russian president was subject to regular elections.

Rather than political purges, many Soviet-era Communists became politicians of various conservative or reform stripes, generally accepting elections as the only legitimate formal route to power. Grassroots political party development was slow, but numerous parties, including the Communist Party, competed in a new legislature that proved at times to be strong enough to counter the president. Despite severe economic troubles, Russian voters did not take the opportunity to return old-style Communists to the main seat of power. This left Russia with an important accomplishment yet to be achieved – the peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party. But this, too, matches the post-war experience: West Germany was led by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union from 1949 until 1969, and after some initial shuffling, Japan was led by the Liberal Democratic Party from 1948 until 1993.20

Finally, in all these cases there were deliberate American strategies at re-education, especially through student, corporate and governmental exchange programmes, university partnerships, media training and (in Russia) the expansion of Internet access. These recall the plans of Dean Acheson to end Japan’s ‘will to war’ – to change the psychology of the Japanese civilization.21

Post-war factors in economic restructuring included fiscal, monetary and structural reform, establishment of new trade relations, and economic democratization such as labour and land reform and deconcentration of ownership. But the three shared another experience as well: dramatic economic declines and widespread suffering. Conditions in Russia were made worse by the contrast with early promises of rapid reform and recovery – perhaps within 500 days.22 The problems with the rule of law, enterprise restructuring, tax collection, central bank lending, campaign-promise spending, capital flight, revenue shortfalls, government overborrowing, lack of foreign direct investment, and state-private corruption were related and negatively reinforcing. Since Russia had never known markets in the lifetimes of its population, it lacked an appropriately skilled ‘management class’. Land and labour reform, for example, both important in Japan, remained restricted under Yeltsin. Widespread privatization was accomplished in Russia, and owners and markets did develop. But the bureaucracy and old directors retained much of their power, and a handful of oligarchs gained the most valuable assets.
Meanwhile, Russia lacked the major economic stimulus of the Marshall Plan or the Korean War. It was not granted special access to American or other markets for its exports, nor even membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead, US agencies like the Trade and Development Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Eximbank were focused on American sales to Russia.

While the cases have much in common, specific tasks need not be identical; there might be ‘factor substitutes’. The lack of occupation at all might be substituted by Gorbachev’s already having Moscow ‘moving in the right direction’. Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Russia was co-opted into reform as much or more than it was coerced. Indeed, the extent to which Russia demilitarized itself might be a better indicator of future prospects than the post-war demilitarizations, since Russia’s actions were ultimately its own, not those of an occupying force. Instead of demilitarization, the United States and Russia cooperated, however imperfectly, on CTR, in the Balkans, and in Central Asia in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Vast political purges also proved unnecessary in Russia’s transition to democracy, even though three-quarters of the Russian elites told pollsters they had been members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communists, socialists, nationalists, reformers, regional interests, single-issue parties, and individual candidates emerged to compete in legislative elections throughout the Yeltsin era, while a Communist and an ex-general were key contenders for the presidency.

Demographically, though, Germany and Japan benefited from ethnically homogeneous populations. Arguably Russia’s largest military and political problems stemmed from its small but ferocious conflict with non-Russian separatists. And Russia’s economic struggles became increasingly blamed on the United States. Its recovery after the 1998 financial crisis was strengthened by higher world oil prices, not by any Marshall Plan.

Finally, international institutions which existed in the 1990s (but not in 1945) should have been able to assist with Russia’s changes. Instead there was widespread criticism of uncoordinated assistance projects, International Monetary Fund (IMF) action and inaction, delays with admission to the WTO, and the uneven expansion of NATO. Additionally, it took a new, ad hoc Contact Group to address the first war in Europe in 50 years. Without the formal structures of occupation, capable and visionary leadership in each country was even more important, but too often was lacking. The issue of leadership moves the discussion from factors to dynamics.

Dynamics in Russia

Beyond task-oriented factors, the experiences of Germany, Japan, and Russia also suggest dynamics critical to advancing the reform efforts of nation-building. Rather than technical, short-term goals such as currency reform or parliamentary elections, they seem to be the broader foundations for overall success. But they can be difficult to measure, and unlike some of the factors above, there do not seem to be ready substitutes for them.

The first dynamic is a mutual commitment to transformation and integration by the leaders of the host country and the international presence. Military government was far from a model of democracy. But if Hirohito, Shigeru Yoshida, Konrad
Adenauer, and Ludwig Erhard had been less cooperative, or Douglas MacArthur, Lucius D. Clay, and John J. McCloy perceived as less benevolent, the entire calculus of the occupations would have changed. The American occupation leaders recognized that they were installing some democracy through non-democratic means. They put the emphasis on achievement instead of method. Yeltsin, largely ruling by decree, assumed power from Gorbachev, freed prices, began privatization, and initiated a new constitution-drafting process all within a year of the failed August 1991 putsch.

Yeltsin was effective when he was committed and organized in the early years, but he did not have a plan for economic restructuring and recovery, he did not develop a broad, loyal constituency of support and he met resistance from the parliament and bureaucracy. Later, his illnesses, erratic behavior and political compromises made him at times unpredictable and unreliable. He seemed to favour reform, but put political expediency ahead of it. Some in Washington were slow to recognize the urgent need for recovery in Germany and Japan, and there were critics of inaction Washington in 1991–1992 as well. But if at the end of the Cold War the United States lacked the vision, organization and influence of a Marshall or MacArthur, in time Russia came to lack an Adenauer or Yoshida who could lead his population and work with the West. President Bill Clinton’s ‘democratic Russia’ idealism may have been appropriate in 1993, but at times he lacked a counterpart with the necessary political skills and commitment to reform. Perhaps the pragmatic realism between Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin was better suited for the next stages of US–Russia cooperation, post-9/11.

In 1945, little in the history and culture of Germany and Japan suggested they were likely to develop into full-fledged democracies over the next few decades. But even as Germany was divided by its rival occupiers, and although Japan developed one-party rule and its own ‘iron triangle’ of policy-making, (West) Germany and Japan did adopt, adapt, and develop the rule of law, market economies, and political liberties that placed them solidly in the Western ideological camp.

The record on institutional quality on Russia is mixed. New and old political aspirants sought power in a popularly-elected parliament, a body which at times served a ‘checks and balances’ role on Yeltsin. The constitution was drafted by appointees of an elected president and ratified in a national referendum. A wide range of new media outlets developed. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of all types tried to develop a more democratic civil society. Privatization of most state-owned enterprises was completed and new firms were founded. And in 1996, the electorate kept Yeltsin in power, over Communist and nationalist alternatives.

On the other hand, the considerable difficulties are also well known. Political party development was lacking and as president, Yeltsin himself never formed or joined one. Critical land reform measures stalled. Major media outlets were owned by a handful of oligarchs. International efforts and funds supported many of the NGOs. Privatization often benefited Soviet-era directors more than Russian workers or small investors. The 1996 presidential election was corrupted by a loans-for-shares deal that distributed some of the country’s best assets to a few insiders who pledged to assure Yeltsin’s re-election. Chechnya remained a political, military, humanitarian, and moral embarrassment. And rather than an open election...
for his successor, Yeltsin artificially pre-positioned his prime minister (and former intelligence chief). Putin has been criticized for his restrictions on the media, NGOs, regional governance, and more; how he faces his constitutional term limit in 2008 is a critical test for Russian democracy.

Germany and Japan demonstrated the host population’s need for evident benefits, security, political, and economic. For the Germans and Japanese, a recognition of their own governments getting themselves into the mess, and an estimation that the occupation forces were generally benevolent, did not preclude the need for economic recovery. As late as 1960, one scholar judged that despite ‘all the impressive gains made . . . under American patronage, the basic economy of [Japan] remains highly precarious’. He warned that Japan was still in a long-term reform process, that economic well-being was important for the continued growth of democracy, and that integrating Japan’s economy into the Western world would help it remain peaceful and prosperous. By the late 1990s, surveys noted that ‘many Russians, both mass and elites, blamed [the economic crisis] in large measure on the West’, while foreign policy sentiment among Russian masses and elites became less ‘accommodationist’ and more ‘hardline’ and ‘isolationist’.

The post-war experiences also suggest that benefits should be visible to the occupying state(s) as well. The American public and US allies had to be persuaded that the democratization of their wartime enemies was both good (inherently) and necessary (against Communism). Sacrifices were made, such as ensuring Japan’s security and accepting uneven trade relations. Risks were taken, as with German re-industrialization. In the Clinton–Yeltsin era, the victorious American public was not asked to sacrifice. Instead, they were promised a ‘peace dividend’ and a triumphant ‘end of history’, and cooled on opinions towards Russia throughout the decade. Russia made dramatic progress in the 1990s, but failed to meet the high expectations some had at the beginning of Yeltsin’s leadership.

The international environment at the end of World War II evolved from weary joy at defeating fascism and militarism to wary preparations for a new kind of war between ideological blocs. In the beginning, the obvious interests were for the occupiers to shape Germany and Japan in their own political image – Moscow did this in its sector of Germany as did the others. The United States emphasized common economic and military goals – reducing the abilities of Germany and Japan to make war again. But this evolved too, as (West) Germany and Japan were seen to need dramatic economic improvement, to reduce the appeal of Communism by improving the economic conditions of the populations and to reduce US government expenditures. Japan did this in the shadow of Communist pressures in China and the Soviet Union. Germany was the fulcrum and the prize of the struggle in Europe.

The end of the Cold War, by contrast, was perhaps the crest of a ‘wave’ of democracy, ushering the ‘end of history’, triumph-of-democracy era. The conversion (or anticipated conversion) of the former Soviet states and satellites, from Central Europe to Central Asia, were celebrated in the spread of democracy ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’. Policy-makers of various political stripes all judged that supporting Russia’s transition to democracy and markets was obviously in the best interest of Russians, Americans, world peace and global prosperity. Recalcitrance in Russia
was perceived to be from those poised to lose power more than genuine ideological debate.

The experiences of Germany, Japan, and Russia also clearly indicate the importance of ‘learning’. At a preliminary level, this might be described as ‘firm principles bundled with operational flexibility’. Policy adjustment can stem from a change in perceived needs, or judgement that current efforts are insufficient. Policies in Japan were changed to reflect the rise of inflation and labour unions as potential threats. Increasing discord between the Soviet Union and the three western occupiers drove policy changes in Germany. Shifting the emphasis of programmes in the mid-1990s from Moscow to the regions was complemented by efforts to increase the role for Russians themselves in the leadership and implementation of assistance programmes. This sense of ‘ownership’ of projects was intended to give Russians a bigger stake in the efforts and the practical experience of ‘doing democracy’ themselves, to respond to critical evaluations of some programmes, and to reduce US costs.32 Legislative elections in the United States in 1994 and in Russia in 1995 also influenced policy changes in each country.

But beyond incremental technical advances and policy changes are broader evolutions toward new attitudes and corresponding improvement in decision-making. Germany’s membership of the European Coal and Steel Community, Japan’s reverse course and Dodge Plan, and Russia’s defence konversiya programmes each had multiple, complementary and mutually reinforcing goals. In contrast to the benefits of the Korean War for Japan, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis had sharply negative effects on Russia. But Russian domestic producers were able to respond better in 1998 than they were to price liberalization in 1992. The Russian private sector was capitalizing on years of experience, practice, understanding, training, and exchanges. Russians were ‘learning’.

Learning was not limited to the private sector. US–Russia structures in NATO, bilateral relationships through a decade of CTR, and joint operational experience in the Balkans provided the ‘classroom and lab’ for both countries that made cooperation after 9/11 possible and productive. The response to those terrorist attacks gave the United States and Russia the opportunity and incentive to really treat each other as allies, something they had been ‘training for’ for a decade.

Learning can be direct. Between 1993 and 2000, the US government funded short- or long-term exchange programmes for nearly 45,000 Russians to come to the United States.33 The substance of the exchanges included governance, business and economics, science, academia, and more; executives and top government officials participated but so did a large number of students and young professionals. Beyond the particular skills acquired in topics like legislative libraries or nuclear materials storage, the Russians and their new American colleagues often formed lasting professional relationships, with formal alumni activities to facilitate. By the end of the decade, the Peace Corps alone was credited with reaching 7,000 students and 1,800 teachers in over two dozen cities each year. As for long-term potential, West Germany so valued post-war exchange programmes that it established the German Marshall Fund 20 years after the occupation was over, to perpetuate such exchanges.
Finally, learning is also generational. Russian public opinion surveys and voting patterns documented that support for democracy, market economics, and cooperation with the West was higher as age was lower. Young, urban, educated Russians preferred a European orientation, while older, rural Russians preferred the Soviet system. Russia’s Churchillian 70 per cent (democracy is the preferred form of government) was considered a crucial foundation for the expansion of Russian democracy at the end of Yeltsin’s term.34

In short, the experiences of post-war Germany and Japan suggest that the vital dynamics in a successful transformation and integration of a former adversary include the mutual commitment to success by capable, visionary leadership on both sides; developing within the constitution and government institutions new democratic habits and values; visible, tangible benefits to all sides; a conducive regional and global operating environment; and learning – critical review of policies in light of changed conditions and improved behavior as a benefit of experience. These dynamics were present in post-war Germany and Japan, and partially present in the Clinton–Yeltsin era efforts, with generally corresponding outcomes. The question is whether these lessons from Germany, Japan, and Russia in the previous century can be useful in the Middle East today.

Germany, Japan, Russia – and Iraq

Among a range of small and large specific differences, the questions for Iraq are analytically similar. The military, economic, and political factors are relevant, and questions on elites, institutional quality, evident benefits, the international environment and learning may be particularly instructive.

Factors in Iraq

The military questions for Russia and Iraq included securing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), dealing with an ethnic insurgency, and incorporating the country into an improved regional and global security architecture. None of these was managed perfectly in Russia, particularly Chechnya. The issue of WMD within Iraq is well known. The other elements, including a continuing insurgency, prospects of civil war and neighbouring Iran remain critical issues.

After a series of political accomplishments,35 the political questions for Iraq (like Russia) focused on one short-term key: co-opting the former elites into a new governing structure. A lasting ‘unity’ government may prove difficult for Iraq because, unlike Russian Communists, the Sunnis are assured minority status as long as parties are based on sectarian differences, and because of the extent of de-Ba’athification. The longer term question is also similar to Russia’s: developing among elites and masses the skills, habits, and preference for democratic principles.

Economically, enormous potential from natural resources gave Iraq and Russia advantages that post-war Japan lacked. After more than two decades of war and sanctions, Iraq must convert to a market economy, rebuild its infrastructure and address the level of decline at the household level, including rampant unemployment.
The absence of security makes this even more difficult than for Russia, which experienced severe problems without a wide insurgency.

Dynamics in Iraq

The prospect of a democratic and market-oriented Russia, preposterous just a few years earlier, became the obvious goal of American and West European leaders and Russian reformers. Yeltsin, his key advisers and their international partners shared a commitment to dismantling central planning and state ownership in favour of a more Western political-economic system. Opposition existed in the parliament, and among some powerful top bureaucrats. Difficulties were underestimated. Clinton supported Yeltsin in the April 1993 popular referendum on his presidency and reforms, and subsequently on other matters, including membership in the G-7 with a Summit of the Eight in Denver in 1997. This commitment to Yeltsin outlasted Yeltsin’s own commitment to reform.

More than three years after regime change, President Bush remains committed to a stable, peaceful, democratic Iraq, confident in the ultimate success of the efforts. His language in the State of the Union messages at the beginning of 2004, 2005, and 2006 attests to an enduring commitment, despite changing conditions in Iraq and in American politics. Correlating with the third anniversary of the March 2003 invasion, he gave a series of speeches to reiterate his commitment and demonstrate progress. Though some of the neoconservative architects of the war had left the administration (such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith), the influence of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney was seen to be waning, and US popular support for the war and for the president himself declined, Bush’s commitment to democracy in Iraq and the Middle East seemed as thorough and genuine as ever.

Iraqi elites themselves were deeply divided. Sunni Arabs faced permanent minority status, the effects of de-Ba’athification and calls for federalism from the Shiites of southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north. Oil, ethnicity, religion, tribes, militias, the insurgency, the Sunni Arab boycott of January 2005 elections, and old-fashioned power struggles combined for volatile post-Saddam politics. Agreement on a draft constitution in 2005 was highly contentious, repeatedly delayed, nearly lost, and settled with deliberately vague language. Efforts to form a new government based on the December 2005 elections were characterized by similar divisions, but also Shiite factions, marginalization of the secular party and growing sectarian violence.

The primary lesson from Russia on institutional quality may be that goals should be extraordinarily high and expectations quite modest. After 25 years of war, sanctions, regime change, and occupation, the Iraqi bureaucracy needs first to become functional and fair. Simple public administrative capacities, without uneven treatment of Iraq’s different groups, would be a considerable achievement. But reforms and restructuring must be based on the rule of law, professionalism and ethics, with particular attention to corruption, if they are to avoid the problems of Russia. The recalcitrant bureaucracy of Russia was able to ignore elements of reform decrees. Even in established democracies, ‘bureaucrats’ can be easy political targets, with
‘Washington bureaucrats’ and ‘Eurocrats’ used as epithets. In Iraq, a key problem was ‘an emphasis on meeting short-term Iraqi security needs at the expense of long-term institution-building’. Iraq needs to develop a synergy between respected leadership, public expectation of mostly capable, mostly honest institutions, and the delivery of same by the judiciary, police, parliament, and ministries.

The evident benefits at the end of the Cold War were to be a ‘peace dividend’ for the West and political and economic advancements for East. Military expenditures by the United States and Western Europe declined from 1987 to 1997 while per capita gross national product (GNP) increased. Beyond financial metrics, pride in victory, satisfaction in seeing democracy spread across Eastern Europe, and permanent relief from prospects of global war were clear benefits. Some Russians benefited enormously: a tiny class of young, urban, and very wealthy Russians, Soviet-era directors who gained control over their profitable enterprises, and a few others. But many more were harmed by inflation (over 2,000 per cent in 1992 alone) and lost wages and benefits (GNP fell by one-third from 1992 to 1996). Life expectancy and overall health declined, especially among men. Relatively competitive elections and freer media were gained, but the prestige of being a superpower was lost.

The benefits for Iraq have also been shared unevenly. But nearly all Iraqis have suffered from the occupation and subsequent insurgency, whether from the violence directly, the economic impact or the inconveniences of checkpoints, curfews, etc. Meanwhile, polls show that Americans increasingly failed to see evident benefits for themselves. Popular US war fatigue developed. Calls to ‘support our troops – bring them home’ increased (and the president’s approval ratings sank) amid a steadily rising casualty count, repeated deployments, a judgement that US efforts were spreading (not reducing) the terrorist threat, and disgruntlement over related (prisoner abuse, wiretapping) and domestic (Hurricane Katrina, immigration) issues. Estimates of the financial costs increased to one trillion or even two trillion dollars.

The international environment for Russia and Iraq are significantly different. Russia enjoyed excellent global conditions for political and economic reform, with some regional complications. The 1989–1992 era was one of small and large democratic progress not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also South Korea, Mexico, South Africa and elsewhere. Russia faced no global threat, and needed only to manage its relationships with its ‘near-abroad’ and the separatist conflict in Chechnya.

Iraq, on the other hand, suffers from an international context defined by the global war on terror, widespread expressions of Muslim rage from Europe to the Philippines, and hostility toward American hegemony and globalization. Iraq’s neighbours are not democracies, some of them are motivated to exacerbate Iraq’s domestic divisions, and the Israel–Palestine issues are closely, negatively associated with the United States. Still, in this international milieu and among escalating violence, increasing numbers of Iraqis came out to vote in the three 2005 polls and the major parties had the chance to form a representative government.

As in Germany and Japan, ‘learning’ in the transformation of Russia – by Russia and by the United States – proved essential but slow. By the end of the Yeltsin–Clinton era, partisan attacks on the Clinton–Gore administration included the summary condemnation that Russia was ‘more corrupt, more lawless, less democratic,
poorer and more unstable’ than in 1993. The Wall Street Journal detailed the list: ‘two Russian stock-market collapses, two brutal bouts of war in Chechnya, a globe-rocking default and devaluation, the rise to power of a former KGB man’, and the Clinton–Gore administration’s failure to recognize the failures or accept blame.

The United States changed its aid policies and priorities in Russia after 1994, re-directing attention to NGOs and to the regions. But it continued to support Yeltsin, despite his personal and political failures. Russia and Russians, meanwhile, adapted to political liberties, market forces, and reduced military status. They benefited from training and exchange programmes and their own experience, and settled on a generally pro-European (more than pro-US) orientation. Crucially, Russia’s political system did not collapse with the economy in 1998. Instead, the economy began a long recovery and the Russian people got in Putin what they seemed to want – strong leadership for restoring order. After Clinton, Gore, and Yeltsin had gone, the decade of US–Russia military cooperation contributed to Russian support (or tolerance) of post-9/11 efforts by the US in Central Asia. Russians and others learned that transition was a very long term effort, much more than 500 days or a Yeltsin decade. Some experienced observers like former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, recognized that learning would take two generations.

In the short-term, Iraq has shown very mixed results. In 2003, Saddam Hussein was removed from power and captured for trial. In 2004, formal political authority was transferred from the occupying coalition to an Iraqi interim government. In 2005, a transitional government was popularly elected, it drafted a constitution which was popularly ratified, and elections for a new parliament were held. On the other hand, post-war looting, insurgency violence and outside terrorist influence have all thwarted economic reconstruction and recovery. The torture scandal of Abu Ghraib ravaged America’s claims to moral legitimacy. The context for forming a government in early 2006 was one of sharply rising sectarian violence despite calls for calm from key leaders in the various factions.

Beyond the construction of capable security forces, infrastructure improvement, economic renewal, and scores of small and large tasks, Iraqis will have to learn – quickly – to govern and to lead democratically. The population had no trouble with this: despite the risk of violence, the elections and referendum in 2005 drew increasingly large turnouts of people committed to a new Iraq. Their leaders faced the option of marshalling their competing interests into a combined effort to confront the escalating bloodshed, or risking civil war. Like the Russian Communists, Iraqi elites had the opportunity to choose electoral democracy and political compromise as the only legitimate route to political power.

The experience of transformation in Russia and the role of foreigners in its transition offers important lessons for Iraq. Russia was considered by some to be ‘different’ from the rest of Eastern Europe, or from democracy theory in general, because of its history, political culture, bureaucracy and geostrategic scale and importance. With Islamic factions, colonial history and authoritarian governance, Iraq and the Middle East in general are also considered by many to be infertile ground for growing democracy. Iraq’s prospects were further complicated by the global war on terror, the dependence of would-be nation-builders on Middle Eastern oil, and shifting patterns in
regional and global politics. What do these cases suggest for the Iraq, the United States and its partners now, over three years after regime change?

Is It Too Late to Learn Lessons for the Future of Iraq?

With the lessons from the historical cases and Russia and the early experience of Iraq, it is possible to recognize mistakes that were made, to consider the range of possible outcomes in Iraq and to consider how these might be achieved, or avoided.

The basics of the historical cases and Russia are still the basics of Iraq. Nation-building is difficult. The range of military, political, and economic tasks is wide; planning and policy adjustments are essential. Security is an essential first step. The key commitments of time, manpower, and money are difficult to sustain. Capable, committed mutual leadership is critical. Co-opting the former leadership to adopt and adapt to the new rules of the game is an historic achievement. A win-win dynamic must trump cold cost-benefit analyses and mere political opportunism. Imbuing professional security forces, macroeconomics, financial regulations, criminal, civil and commercial codes, and courts and other institutions with democratic virtues is an uncertain and long-term venture. As global and regional conditions evolve, changes in the direction of reform, or even of the goals, may be warranted.

In the face of continuing difficulties, a rapidly emerging body of literature on Iraq is beginning to echo the libraries full of ‘Who lost Russia?’ By the mid to late 1990s, there was no shortage of suspects: Russian oligarchs and reformers, ineffective US aid strategies and mechanisms, President George H.W. Bush and other Western leaders early on, Vice President Al Gore, the second Clinton administration, or more broadly, the entire Western community of Russia experts who ‘committed malpractice throughout the 1990s’. Others acknowledged Russia was lost, but said there was no one to blame: Russia was not ‘ours’ to lose. Its economy, ecology, health, psychology, and institutions were far worse off than anyone knew, and its cultural inheritance was ill-equipped for democratization, externally imposed or not.

As American costs and casualties and Iraqi sectarian violence rose, ‘Who lost Iraq?’ criticism addressed a wide range of issues. Much of it emphasized the extent to which planning was not done, or to which important planning was ignored. The State Department’s Future of Iraq Project, and its dismissal by the Defense Department, was frequently cited. A related issue was the sharp rebuke of Rumsfeld’s decision to send far fewer troops to Iraq for the post-conflict phase than top generals like Anthony Zinni and Eric Shinseki had recommended. Management of the first weeks after the fall of Baghdad was also widely criticized. Among these, perhaps the most important were the failure to stop the looting, the broad de-Ba’athification programme, and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army.

Decisions themselves were not the only subject of criticism. The decision-making process itself was attacked, with particular attention to inter-agency troubles, especially between Defense and State. On the ground in Iraq, the enthusiasm and dedication of the nation-building staff were applauded, but not the make-up of the staff, long on youth and political appointees and short on relevant language skills and Middle East expertise.
The question is not merely whether mistakes might be made, but whether leaders can review and improve on their efforts — whether they can benefit from learning. Over time, the Clinton administration made deliberately pro-Yeltsin decisions, choosing realpolitik over idealism. Bush reiterated his belief in the synergy between what is good for Iraq, the Middle East and America in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (November 2005), the *National Security Strategy* (March 2006), and his series of speeches in spring 2006. Beyond new documents, policy adjustments have developed. The State Department has a new office of stabilization and reconstruction and a new focus on ‘transformational diplomacy’, the Pentagon has adopted aspects of post-conflict stabilization as a core function of the military, and diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad has returned to Iraq.

**Achieving – and Avoiding – Possible Outcomes in Iraq**

The acceptable range of outcomes may have been very narrow in fall 2002, based on the optimistic scenarios of administration neoconservatives to spread freedom and security, boosted by promises by certain exiles of flower-tossing Iraqis welcoming their coalition liberators. Germany and Japan were the models: free, prosperous, peaceable allies of the West. But as sectarian militias rose, and an insurgency with an undetermined level of foreign support persisted, the medium-term goals for Iraq became more modest.

Three years on, the Germany-Japan model remained for the president a long-term hope: an Iraqi democracy that shapes a more democratic Middle East. Here, recognition of post-war shortcomings is important. Germany was divided for four decades, with a portion of its population under Soviet Communism. Japan had one-party rule and an ‘iron triangle’ political economy. But the success of externally imposed democratic institutions and the domestic development of compatible values remains the iconic model.

At the other end of the spectrum, chaos and civil war represent obvious failure. So too does an improved version of ‘old Iraq’ — a stable, authoritarian, internally divided state without WMD, without state support of terrorism and without particular hostilities to Europe, the United States or Israel. This Iraq might have been achieved without the war at all. It would amount to a dramatic political failure for President Bush (and Prime Minister Tony Blair) and America more broadly, as well as for the Iraqi people. It would remove only one component from the ‘terror premium’ of the global price of oil, and do little if anything to restore Iraq’s economy. It would secure against any hope of a democratic domino-effect in the Middle East, discredit future US ‘commitments’ in the region, and reinforce for the jihadist world the US lessons of Lebanon (1983–1984) and Somalia (1993–1994).

Bosnia-Herzegovina offers another possible outcome. This Iraq approximates what some seek or fear in a shift to acute federalism. Iraq would exhibit a calm domestic security environment, due in part to strong regions and a permanent peacekeeping mission. Regional divisions, institutionalized and certified by the international environment, would preclude state-wide political and economic development. Minority rights would remain fragile. A question for Iraq is whether, so divided, it
could marshal its potential natural resource wealth to redevelop and to raise living standards.

Russia models another possible outcome. Iraq might demonstrate remarkable political progress over a decade (say, 2002 compared to 2012), analogous to the development from late-Brezhnev sclerosis through Gorbachev to early, radical-reform Yeltsin (say, 1982–1992). Russians lost their superpower status; indeed, the Soviet Union dissolved. They suffered economically, and gained only incomplete political liberalism. Russia became, instead of Germany or Japan, a mostly ‘normal’ country. It is more or less an electoral democracy. It has a decade and a half of political rights and civil liberties, although the trend line is negative. It pursues an aggressive foreign policy of realpolitik, sometimes cooperative and sometimes in conflict with the West and with its neighbours, but not with force of arms.

Russia also models problems that Iraq will face for some time. Terrorism, in the radical separatists in Chechnya and their connections to al-Qaeda, persisted as a political and security issue, although without disrupting daily life for most Russians. Russia was endowed with vast natural resources, but also a crumbled infrastructure and contentious ownership issues. Another lesson that Iraq might learn from Russia: the United States and Europe continued to accept Yeltsin and Putin even when they displayed increasingly illiberal tendencies. After 15 years with no democratic alteration of power, Western responses to Putin’s handling of Russia’s 2008 presidential elections will serve as additional guideposts for elites in Iraq.

Can – should – the US and its allies accept Russia as a model for Iraq? The critical question is whether the United States and its allies would judge such an outcome to be a modest success or a dangerous disappointment. Iraq could form and maintain some reasonably representative parliament, end (or sharply limit) the sectarian and jihadist violence, establish the rule of law and limited, credible political rights and liberties, pursue a rational, non-nuclear foreign policy based on self-interest, regional stability and decent global citizenry, benefit from its natural resources and begin to rebuild its economy more broadly. It would fall far short of the goals of those in the Bush administration who sought by force to create a democratic ally and transform the Middle East. But it would also be a considerable achievement, positioning Iraq and its people for a better future than the quarter-century of war and sanctions that preceded it. The question is whether lessons from Russia might help achieve – or avoid – such an outcome.

Policy Choices for the Second Thousand Days

In the first thousand days after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, a long series of political achievements had been accomplished, culminating in the December 2005 election of a new Iraqi parliament. But the ongoing insurgency, a rise in sectarian violence, and a decline in US popular support forced the administration and its allies to closely examine its future role in Iraq.

The policy choice consistently articulated by the Bush administration is ‘stay the course’. The president’s fundamental theses of pre-emption and democratic peace have been repeated over and over. Threats to the United States must be stopped before they fully emerged, and war must be brought to the terrorists lest the terrorists
bring war to the US again – the extent of Iraqi connections to al-Qaeda before 9/11, notwithstanding. On the positive side, all people want democracy, democratic states provide peace and liberty, and a democratic Iraq will lead to a democratic Middle East, despite the risk of Hamas-like victories. ‘As long as necessary, but not one day more’ has been the pledge for more than two years.53

This approach focuses on achieving benchmarks in national level politics while fighting a guerrilla war with what one analyst criticized as a ‘whack-a-mole’ strategy.54 Acknowledgement of the continuing difficulties against the insurgents is countered by the administration with assurances that much progress is being made in Iraq that goes largely unreported.

A second approach would be to adjust the goals – to aim lower. In this fourth year after regime change, some see the options as either abandoning ‘idealism’ for ‘realism’ or risking civil war while tilting at Jeffersonian windmills. American post-war occupation officials acknowledged their ‘undemocratic democratization’ efforts. As the environment evolved, sub-optimal policy changes were made: support for labour unions in Japan was abandoned, and the former allies divided the German state. With Yeltsin, at some point US policy-makers like Strobe Talbott ‘had only distasteful options’ at their disposal.55 ‘Aim lower’ is the choice for those who see only distasteful options: continued American commitment and casualties in pursuit of possible, limited achievement, or withdrawal and sure chaos.

The third option is to do better. The Marshall Plan, the reverse course, and the end of IMF support for the rouble were controversial, critical, and ultimately effective decisions. Robert Wolfe, an American officer in Germany, emphasized that throughout the occupation, ‘We were learning; it was a conscious learning process.’56 Domestic and international improvements are still possible in Iraq.

In the mid-1990s, the United States shifted its non-security aid priorities in Russia from the central government to regional and local efforts. The goals included making dramatic progress in reform-minded regions, and transferring ‘ownership’ of the reforms from the government or foreign NGOs to Russians themselves. Recent analyses have supported a similar shift for US strategy in Iraq. Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis prescribed a ‘full-spectrum operations’ approach for improving the conditions in Iraq and winning the hearts-and-minds war.57 Citing effectiveness in Baghdad’s Sadr City, Chiarelli and Michaelis argue that concentrating on combating insurgents and training Iraqi forces omits essential efforts – providing essential services, promoting good governance, and developing economic pluralism – that could be ongoing simultaneously in many areas of the country. They seek to achieve small, local, cumulative ‘victories’ such as steady employment and more reliable electrical and sewage systems.

Related to this is the question of whether to directly engage elements of the insurgency in political negotiations – reports, denials, and confirmations appeared in 2005.58 Insurgents in Mozambique were co-opted into the political process in the early 1990s, but not in Chechnya. Negotiations with Sunni insurgents might be unpalatable for Israel, Iran, and Americans strategically committed not to ‘negotiate with terrorists’. If full-spectrum operations induced a more cooperative or even acquiescent line from insurgents losing the passive support of Iraqis, the opportunity to
deal with them from a position of strength would be difficult to dismiss out of hand. Those committed to violence will have to be dealt with, of course. But there might have been many benefits for Russia in finding a political solution to Chechnya early on.

The administration also has a chance at new options outside Iraq. First is an overall policy turn to multilateralism on Iraq and other issues, already underway with its allies in NATO, Japan, Australia, and others. And as Richard Nixon went to China, so too could Bush go to the UN. The August 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, its top envoy to occupied Iraq, and 23 other UN and NGO staff. The dangerous environment continued to affect UN’s efforts, with only $438 million in disbursements from the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund through January 2006, compared to $10 billion disbursed by the US Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. But UN efforts will become an increasingly large percentage of the total reconstruction effort as US funding declines. An invigorated role for the UN and more real cooperation with traditional allies would renew international legitimacy for the effort, assure doubting Americans that Iraq is not a lost cause, reinforce the message in the Muslim world that it is not a ‘crusade’ nor ‘oil colonialism’, and more substantially utilize the UN’s nation-building experience and expertise and that of NGOs that would follow. And a greater UN role in Iraq might stem, or improve, the role of Iran.

Iran’s support of terrorist organizations, its support of insurgents in Iraq, its nuclear ambitions, and its oil wealth make it a crucial, formidable concern. Former secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and others suggested working with Iran. James Dobbins noted US cooperation with Stalin during World War II, Cold War dictators around the world, and Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman in 1995. Others instead advise supporting elements in Iran which might facilitate a democratic revolution. The Allies had to deal with the Soviet Union’s interests in Germany. Improving policy in Iraq will have to consider the proper role, if any, of Iran.

In reality, parts of all of these options are likely to characterize the Iraq policy for the remainder of the Bush administration. The President has given no indication of yielding on his commitment to the central theses of pre-emption and democratic peace, but changes in military, political, and economic tactics have already begun. With lessons from Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad returned to Iraq in 2005. ‘Full-spectrum operations’ advocate Peter Chiarelli became commander of the Multi-National Forces Iraq in early 2006. The White House and members of Congress pressured Iraqis to form a ‘unity’ government, but also promised cuts in reconstruction aid. Moving forward, the White House has committed to working with Congress’ independent, bipartisan (and all-star) Iraq Study Group in its quest for new solutions.

Conclusion

The historical cases of nation-building and the transition of post-Cold War Russia continue to offer insight into the situation in Iraq, even three years after regime change. Accomplishing the necessary security, political, and economic tasks is part of the story. The continued commitment of the US and international community,
the role of elites and the benefits of learning can be key indicators of Iraq’s development potential.

Capable, committed, mutual leadership was a key to the development of Germany, Japan and Russia. Despite a range of difficulties in Iraq, among allies and in the United States, the Bush administration has remained committed in word and deed to the transformation of Iraq. But the search continued for an Iraqi leader or leaders to rise above the political fray to lead a new Iraq. The emergence of Iraqi leadership will help propel or hinder the development of the other dynamics.

But there was unmistakable progress. The real role of the Transitional National Assembly, elected in early 2005, was far greater than its considerable task of drafting a constitution. The assembly and the negotiations before and after the referendum on the constitution were the workshops, the laboratories, in which Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite leaders gauged their own prospects and the prospects of their constituencies under a new political system. They established precedent for whether and how the various religious, ethnic, geographic, and other divisions might be overcome on a national scale. Moreover, they did so amid a continuing insurgency. The 2006 politicking to form a new parliamentary government continued to nurture nascent democratic skills among Iraq’s elites. Early difficulties, and even early failures, will not indicate long-term disorder as long as the key representative interests remain committed to this kind of politicking instead of retreating to coups, secession or open advocacy of violence.

The emergence of new Iraqi leadership, the development of institutional quality, and the resulting benefits for ordinary Iraqis will be a function of learning, among Iraqis as well as the United States and coalition partners. There are contradictory lessons from Germany, Japan, and Russia. In Iraq, the international community will support efforts to create and maintain a parliamentary government. Redirecting energy to local, visible efforts, politically engaging certain elements of the insurgency, elevating the role of the UN or including Iran at all would be controversial and might well fail. Changes of this magnitude would parallel the Marshall Plan, the reverse course and end of IMF lending to Russia, but would still not guarantee success. Accumulating Iraqi political milestones and pursuing the committed insurgents is necessary but perhaps not sufficient — few in the administration expected the results so far.

While outsiders may continue to pursue or change their military objectives, though, their political influence within Iraq may be increasingly limited. They may be supportive and encouraging and persistent, but not decisive. As creating a constitution and a government demonstrated, only if the formidable political tasks can be agreed upon by Iraqis, and convincingly explained to the various Iraqi constituencies, can a real promise of democracy begin to develop. Ultimately, it was only the people and leaders of Germany, Japan, and Russia that could decide whether and how to develop their own strains of democracy; so now too Iraq.

The Iraqi masses and elites will certainly continue to ‘learn’ in one direction or another — to gain new understandings and adapt their actions and attitudes accordingly. Efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, develop the economy, and support exchange programmes in education, business, and governance
can all contribute to learning. But there is nothing like ‘learning by doing’, in which Iraq is now engaged. The question remains whether Iraqis will ‘learn’ new ways to reconcile their ethnic differences, their competing interpretations of Islam and the basic tenets of democracy in ways that improve life for ordinary Iraqis and develop Iraq into a peaceful, emerging democracy (and even a model for the Middle East, a ‘shining city in the sand’?), or whether instead they will learn that divisions can continue to be exploited for personal gain, that the West is disrespectful or even disdainful of Islam, and that US interests are incompatible with their own. Perhaps we can note the judgement of Publilius Syrus, a 1st century BC Syrian brought to Rome a slave but who earned his freedom: it is better to learn late than never.62

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NOTES


7. Significant and lasting commitments of ‘time, manpower and money’ are cited identically in Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, and in Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building*.

8. Douglas Porch, for example, dismissed Iraq as having ‘a people susceptible to hysteria and fanaticism’ and ‘a ruling class that inclines toward demagogy and corruption’ incapable of generating a Yoshida or Adenauer, in ‘Occupational Hazards: Myths of 1945 and US Iraq Policy’, *The National Interest* (Summer 2003).


10. The efforts of the Center for Strategic and International Studies which produced Orr’s *Winning the Peace* also contributed to the creation of the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

11. The Mozambique narrative is summarized in Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, pp.93–106.

12. Except where noted, the emphasis here is generally on the Boris Yeltsin era, 1992–1999, comparable in length to the post-war occupations.


18. O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, described the democratization processes in Latin America as ‘nonlinear, uncertain, and reversible’ and ‘satisficing’ [a mix of satisfaction and sacrificing].

19. The same criticisms were detailed in 2002 as in the 1990s: underfunding, insufficient cooperation between the United States and Russia, and insufficient cooperation between each country’s own agencies. See, for example, a summary of the panel on ‘Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction’, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 14–15 November 2002, on the website of the Center for Defense Information, <www.cdi.org/russia/232-8.cfm>.

20. More accurately, the Japanese prime ministers had the support of the Liberal Party, Democratic Party or a coalition of the two from 1948 to 1955, when the two parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party.


24. On ‘elite transformations’ as the ‘fulcrum for fundamental political change’, see Michael Burton and John Higley, ‘The Study of Political Elite Transformations’, *International Review of Sociology*, Vol.11, No.2 (2001), p.182. Elites can include political elites but also leaders in civil service, military, business, unions, media, intelligentsia and large civic or religious organizations. See also Higley and Burton,
27. Zimmerman, *The Russian People and Foreign Policy*, pp.98–101, 185. Looking ahead, one might be concerned not only about continuing economic pressures on ordinary Iraqis, but also about future cyclical downturns.
34. The two-thirds of Russians who in 1999 responded affirmatively to whether, despite democracy’s problems, it ‘is better than any other form of rule’, up from 57 per cent in 1995, in Zimmerman, *The Russian People and Foreign Policy*, p.50.
35. These benchmarks include: establishing the Iraqi Governing Council (July 2003), Transitional Administrative Law (March 2004), formal transfer of authority to Interim Iraqi Government (June 2004), elections for Iraqi Transitional Government (January 2005), referendum on new Iraqi constitution (October 2005), elections for first permanent government (December 2005), parliament convenes for the first time (March 2006).
36. From the State of the Union, January 2004: ‘America will never be intimidated by thugs and assassins. The killers will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom’. January 2005: ‘Our commitment remains firm and unchanging. We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends.’ January 2006: ‘Our enemies and our friends can be certain: The United States will not retreat from the world, and we will never surrender to evil. . . . We are in this fight to win, and we are winning.’
39. From 1987 to 1997, Western European military expenditures declined (in constant 1997 US dollars) 15 per cent with a 22 per cent decline in the number of troops, and from 8.3 to 5.5 per cent of central government spending. US spending declined 26 per cent with a one-third decrease in number of troops (from 2.2 million to 1.5 million), and from 27 per cent to 16 per cent of federal spending. Russian troop levels also fell by one-third between 1992 and 1997, but its per capita GDP declined sharply even before the 1998 crash. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, April 2000), esp. pp.65, 100, 109.


51. Nation-building elites bring their own experience and ideological commitments, as Jeffrey Sachs did to Russia with lessons from Polish and Bolivian shock therapy, and as Rumsfeld did with ‘military transformation’ ideas based on smaller, post-Cold War military threats and tasks. See Eric Shinseki, testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 February 2003, and Anthony Zinni, speech at the Center for Defense Information, 12 May 2004.


61. See, for example, Michael Ledeen, testimony to the US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, 8 March 2006.